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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH, RICH COUNTY

*

Plaintiff and Appellee,

*
*
*
*
*
*

vs.
LARRY H. BREITWEISER,
Defendant and Appellant.

Case No. 970596-CA
Priority No. 2

*

STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE APPELLATE COURT
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court of Appeals by Utah Code Annotated 782A-3(2)(e).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The issues identified by Defendant and Appellant are sufficient for the Court to
Review claimed error.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Standard of Review for Findings of Fact. The reviewing court must decide

that the findings are not adequately supported by the record resolving all disputes and
evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court or jury's determination.
2.

Determinations of Law. The standard review for questions of law is that

of correctness, the Appellant Court owes no difference to the Trial Court's
Determination.
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994).
DETERMINATIVE. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUES.
ORDINANCES AND RULES
1

Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44 (10)
An officer may, without a warrant arrest a person for violation at this section
when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in
his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that a violation was caused
by the person.
Utah Code Annotated 41-6-44.10
See Addendum A
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 506
See Addendum B
Jury Verdict
See Addendum C
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case:
Defendant was charged for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor on

September 6, 1996 in Rich County, State of Utah.
B.

Course of Proceedings:
Defendant entered a plea of not guilty, requested a trial by jury. The matter was

tried before a jury on July 7, 1997. The jury rendered a verdict of guilty. The pre-trial
Motion to Suppress was denied by the court. The Defendant's post-trial Motion to Arrest
a judgement was denied.
C.

Disposition in Trial Court:
The jury returned a verdict of guilty. The Defendant was sentenced on September

22, 1997.
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D.

Relevant Facts:
On the 6th day of September, 1996 the Defendant was driving Eastbound on the

"Monte Cristo" Road from Ogden, Utah to Woodruff, Utah. The Defendant was involved
in a one-car roll-over which ejected the Defendant from his vehicle.
The road in the area of the accident was a two lane straight road, mostly fields on
one side and summer range on the other side. TR 121. There is a small bend in the road
at the accident site TR 109. There were no visible obstructions observed by the officer
following the accident TR 101. There is no evidence of a collision with animals, no
collision with either livestock or other animals. There didn't "appear to be a lot of reasons
for that to happen." Officer Dale Stacey. TR 123. The accident happened in the evening
with the sun behind the Defendant. Skid marks on the road showed the Defendant's car
"gone over to the left, over corrected and came back to the right." The Defendant's
vehicle left the road and was sitting on it's wheels in a field off the south side of the road.
TR 110. Dale Stacey, Rich County Sheriffs Deputy, was proceeding West bound,
unaware of the accident. He had passed other East bound vehicles without being notified
by them of the accident. TR 136. He came upon the accident, saw the skid marks on the
road and walked to the Defendant's vehicle. TR 110. He observed damage to the vehicle
and damage to the fence. TR 110. "And stuff was scattered down the side of the road."
TR110.
As the officer walked down the steep embankment and started to climb the fence
he was confronted by the Defendant's dog, TR 111. At that time he heard the call,
"hello?" The officer determined that the Defendant was pinned under his truck, TR 112.
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The front wheels of the truck were in one ditch and the rear wheels of the truck were in a
parallel ditch, TR 113. Defendant's head was in the ditch, under the rear wheel of his
truck, TR 115. The Defendant was alone and had been ejected from his vehicle during
the rollover. TR 129. When Deputy Stacey observed the Defendant under the truck he
then immediately called for an ambulance from Woodruff, Utah. A second officer
arrived by the name of James Gregory, a conservation officer stationed in Randolph,
Utah. TR 116. Officer Gregory had driven up the road one and a half to two hours
before being called to the scene of the accident without observing the accident. TR 161.
Deputy Stacey smelled alcohol on the Defendant's person while the Defendant
was pinned under his truck. TR 121. The officer arrived on the scene at approximately
8:00 p.m. TR 124. Blood was drawn at approximately 8:40 p.m. Probable cause for the
arrest was based upon the smell of alcohol on the Defendant and the totality of the facts
of the accident known to the officer, as described in page 3 hereof. TR 124. The
Defendant was placed under arrest prior to blood being drawn. TR 149. The blood was
drawn by an EMT qualified to draw blood by the name of Kery Stacey, a brother to the
Deputy Stacey. Kery Stacey arrived at the scene, found gas leaking from the wrecked
vehicle near the head of the Defendant. TR 181. Defendant was extracted as soon as
possible. EMT Stacey obtained a consent of the Defendant to draw the blood. TR 185 &
186. He drew the blood according to established procedures and used a kit furnished by
the State of Utah. EMT Stacey was on the scene 15-20 minutes prior to the blood draw.
30-35 minutes had elapsed between the call to EMT Stacey and the time that he drew
blood.
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The blood was ultimately tested by the Utah State Toxicology lab. Exhibit 2. Toxicology
report describes blood alcohol as follows: Blood Alcohol: 0.12% (W/V Ethanol)
Barbara Jeppsen describes the results of the tests as a weight by volume. TR 234. The
blood test was admitted into evidence without objection by Defendant's counsel. TR
255.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
1.

Defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence available to Deputy

Stacey to provide probable cause for the arrest of the Defendant. The State claims that
the articular facts in this case, as shown by the testimony of the officer, provide
substantial probable cause for the arrest under the provisions of 41-6-44(10).
2.

Secondly, Defendant claims that the Deputy exceeded his authority in

requiring the Defendant to submit to a blood test. It is the State's position that the
Deputy, having found probable cause to arrest the Defendant, was, therefore, authorized
by law, under the provisions of 41-6-44.10 to request blood from the Defendant for the
purpose of determining alcohol content. The State further argues that the record is devoid
of any facts showing coercion of the Defendant by the officer in requesting consent to
take blood.
3.

Defendant claims that the State failed to present evidence establishing the

elements of the offense charged, namely that the Defendant was guilty of having a blood
alcohol content of .08 percent greater by weight. The State contends that the toxicology
report clearly shows that the blood alcohol content of the Defendant was measured by
weight and by percentage, which evidence is supported by the testimony of the

5

toxicologist.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT CLAIMS THE DEPUTY LACKED
PROBABLE CAUSE TO ARREST MR. BREITWEISER.
The first issue claimed by the Defendant is whether or not there was sufficient
attenuation between the illegal arrest of Mr. Breitweiser and the blood draw. Therefore,
the first question must be whether or not there was an illegal arrest.
A.

State claims that the arrest was based upon probable cause.

Defendant appears to assume that the arrest was unlawful. The trial court found
that there was sufficient probable cause for the officer to arrest the Defendant.
Section 41-6-44 (a)(10) provides that a peace officer may, without a warrant,
arrest a person without a warrant arrest a person for a violation of this section
when the officer has probable cause to believe the violation has occurred,
although not in his presence and if the officer has probable cause to believe that
the violation was committed by the person.
Neither party has alleged that there were other persons in the Defendant's vehicle.
However, there was a dog present. Therefore the sole question under the provision is
whether or not there is probable cause for the officer to arrest the Defendant for the
violation.
Defendant would have this court believe that the only evidence before the court
was the officers detection of the smell of alcohol upon the person of the Defendant while
the Defendant was under the vehicle. The record shows substantial other indicia of
driving under the influence of alcohol.
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This court could reasonable conclude that, absent substantial mechanical
malfunction, automobiles do not leave the road in the pattern described by the officer.
That pattern is produced by the driver. The one car roll-over took place approximately
seven miles west of Woodruff, Utah, on a two lane, relatively straight road without
obstructions. TR 121. The vehicle drifted to the left which would be across the center
line (a violation of 41-6-53 Utah Code annotated 1987 as amended). The driver then over
corrected to such an extent that he left a critical scuff mark on the road. TR 121, overshot
the right hand lane of the road, went off the road to the right, down a steep embankment,
through a fence, and into a ditch. TR 121. There was no evidence of an obstruction in
the road such as animals, nor did the Defendant say anything about an obstruction in the
road. TR 117. Additionally, the Defendant admitted to consuming an alcoholic
beverage. TR 120.
The totality of the evidence, not just the admission by the Defendant to consuming
alcohol, gives rise to a reasonable officer finding probable cause. Layton City vs. Noon,
736 P.2d 1035 (Utah app. 1987).
In determining whether Officer Robinett had probable cause to arrest Noon for
driving under the influence of alcohol we must ask:
Whether or not from the facts known to the officer, and the influences which
fairly might be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in this position
would be justified in believing that the suspect had committed the offense.
There must be a distinction drawn between cases of reasonable suspicion to stop
and probable cause to arrest. In this case the issue relating to reasonable suspicion to stop
is nonexistent. The Defendant was stopped and had been stopped for some period of time

7

while lying underneath his vehicle. The sole question becomes whether or not there is
probable cause to arrest. This is a question of fact which the court found in favor of the
Plaintiff.
Prior to the time of the arrest there was no illegal conduct committed by the State
which was alleged nor proved by the Defendant and therefore the doctrine of attenuation
found in State vs. Hamm, 910 P.2d 433 (Utah App., 1996) is inapplicable to this case.
Defendant's Brief, p. 13.
B.

The second issue under this point is whether or not the Defendant

voluntarily consented to have the blood drawn. The Defendant, on page 14 of his brief,
contends that because of the proximity of the arrest to the request for the drawing of
blood and the absence of intervening circumstances, the arrest statement was an attempt
to demonstrate police authority and impliedly conveys a threat.
Not withstanding the Defendant's injuries, he was able to communicate during his
extraction from the vehicle as to where he hurt. And following his extraction of the
vehicle he was able to accurately communicate with the officer concerning his admission
that he had consumed alcohol. TR 120. If the officer had placed the Defendant under
arrest, having determined the probable cause existed for the arrest, then the consent to
draw the blood is a statutory procedure provided in 41-6-44.10 (2) (a).
Whether consent was voluntarily given is a question of fact to be determined from
the totality of the circumstances. State vs. Robinson 797 P.2d. 437 (Utah App. 1990), at
page 437, which says as follows:
Two factors determine whether consent to search is lawfully obtained following
8

police action that violates the fourth amendment such as the unlawful detention
here:
1.

The consent must be voluntary in fact

2.

The consent must not be obtained by police exploitation of prior illegality.

In this case there is no prior illegality, so the sole question is whether or not the
consent was voluntarily given. Quoting further from State vs. Robinson:
Whether a consent to a search was in fact voluntary or was the product of duress
or coercion, expressed or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the
totality of all the circumstances.
Quoting from State vs. Hamm at page 439, infra:
(1)
(2)
(3)

There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was
unequivocal and specific and was freely and intelligently given:
The government must prove that consent was given without duress or
coercion, expressed or implied.
(When evaluating these first two standards, we) indulge every reasonable
presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and
there must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived."

The Defendant's sole claim to the involuntary consent given is the fact that the
officer arrested the Defendant prior to requesting consent to draw blood. Brief page 14,
Defendant claims the officer was on a fishing expedition because he did not possess
sufficient subjective facts to support a probable cause for the arrest. Defendant criticizes
the arresting officer for not asking the Defendant to perform field sobriety tests. The
Defendant criticizes the arresting officer for not giving the Defendant the admonition
found in the DUI report form. Defendant's brief addendum D. However, the admonition
is only required following the Defendants refusal. See 41-6-44.10.a
C.

Defendant claims the blood draw and the results privileged.

The arresting officer, Dale Stacey, is a Rich County EMT. His brother Kery
9

Stacey, a mechanic-cattleman, is also an EMT in Rich County. EMT stands for
"Emergency Medical Technician." They are not licensed physicians, mental health
therapists, social worker, marriage counselor, family therapists, advanced practical
nurses, designated as registered psychiatric mental health nurse specialists or professional
counselors.
An EMT is what the name applies and nothing more.
The Utah Rules of Evidence found in Addendum B do not specify an EMT as
being either a physician or a mental health therapist. The definition of patient is one who
consults or is examined by a physician or mental health therapist.
The record is totally devoid of any evidence by the Defendant that he reasonably
believed Kery Stacey or Dale Stacey to be a licensed physician or mental health therapist.
The record is devoid of any evidence that any communication by the Defendant
was communicated in confidence for the purpose of diagnosing or treating the Defendant
for mental illness.
There is no need to look at the exceptions (d) to the rule, as the rule itself is
inapplicable to this situation. The trial court erred in giving application to the rule under
the circumstances, however that error by the court did not substantially affect the outcome
of the trial.
POINT II
DEFENDANT CLAIMS THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY
DENIED THE MOTION TO ARREST JUDGEMENT.
Following the trial the Defendant made a motion to arrest judgement under Rule
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32 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The substance of Rule 23 is as follows:
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court, upon its own motion
may, or upon the motion of a Defendant, shall arrest judgement if the facts proved
or admitted do not constitute a public offense, or the Defendant is mentally ill, or
there is cause for the arrest of judgement. Upon arresting judgement the court
may, unless a judgement of acquittal of the offense charge is entered or jeopardy
has attached, order a commitment until the Defendant is charged a new or retired,
or may enter any other order as may be just and proper under the circumstances.
The information by the state charged the Defendant with operating a vehicle
having a blood content of .08 or greater.
The requirement of the statute is grams of alcohol per hundred milliliters of blood.
Therefore, 8 grams of alcohol per hundred milliliters of blood is equal to .08 percent
blood alcohol. Exhibit 2, which is the results of the examination of the blood by the Utah
State Department of Toxicology, finds the results as follows:
"Blood alcohol: 0.12% (w/v) ethanol"
The witness, Barbara Jeppsen, a toxicologist for the State of Utah, testified that
she examined the blood drawn from the Defendant and that it contained .12%. TR 222.
Witness further explained that the method of analyzation was weight by volume. TR 234
L23.
Instruction 2 as approved by the Defendant asked the jury to determine a finding
as follows: "That while operating said vehicle or while being in actual physical control of
the vehicle at the time and place alleged, he had a .08 gram breath alcohol content or
greater."
The instruction was talked about in chambers prior to being given to the jury and
Defendant's counsel agreed upon the language. TR 273 - 4. It is this instruction that Mr.
11

Oliver now claims as being error.
Counsel cannot assist in the inducement of error by the court and then claim error
upon appeal. The verdict in this case signed by the jury is consistent with the statute.
Addendum C.
CONCLUSION
Defendant attempts to demonstrate to this court error committed by the State of
Utah by infusing into the fact situation evidence not presented at trial and conclusions not
reasonably drawn from the evidence.
Reducing this case to the simple logic leaves but one conclusion and that is that
the officer had probable cause to arrest the Defendant, taking into consideration all facts
and circumstances of the accident including the smell of alcohol upon the Defendant's
person. The consent to take blood alcohol was obtained after arrest which is not in and of
itself coercive. Therefore, the judgement and conviction of the Defendant should be
affirmed.

n

DATED this /C_ day of h/Xt

, 1998./V
/

/

/ George W. Preston
^
Rich County Attorney
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I, George W. Preston, Rich County Attorney, certify that on the

day of June,

1998,1 served a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE upon Counsel for the
Appellant of this matter by mailing it to D. Bruce Oliver, 180 South 300 West, Suite 210,
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1490.
DATED this _ _ _ day of June, 1998
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ADDENDUM A

41-6-43.5

MOTOR VEHICLES
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(b) a certificate of insurance issued under Section 41-12a-402;
(c) a certified copy of a surety bond issued under Section 41-12a-405;
(d) a certificate of the state treasurer issued under Section 41-12a-406;
(e) a certificate of self-funded coverage issued under Section 41-12a407; or
(f) information that the vehicle or driver is insured from the Uninsured
Motorist Identification Database Program created under Title 41, Chapter
12a, Part 8.
(8) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, and shall be fined not less
than $100, who:
(a) when requested to provide security information under Subsection
(1), or Section 41-12a-303.2, provides false information;
(b) falsely represents to the department that security required under
this chapter is in effect; or
(c) sells a vehicle to avoid the penalties of this section as applicable
either to himself or a third party.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-35.5, enacted by L.
1986 (2nd S.S.), ch. 4, § 2; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 28; 1988, ch. 98, § 2; 1993, ch. 202, § 1;
1993, ch. 234, § 30; 1997, ch. 51, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997, added Subsections

(2)(d) and (7)(f); inserted "and other information available to the peace officer does not
indicate that owners or operator's security is in
effect" in Subsection (4)(a); redesignated former
Subsection (4)(c) as Subsection (4)(b)(iv); and
made numerous stylistic changes.

ARTICLE 5
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS
DRIVING
41-6-43.5.

Definitions.

As used in this article, "vehicle" or "motor vehicle," in addition to the
definitions provided under Section 41-6-1, includes off-highway vehicles as
defined under Section 41-22-2.
History: C. 1953, 41-6-43.5, enacted by L.
1996, ch. 121, § 1.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1996, ch. 121

became effective on April 29, 1996, pursuant to
Utah Const., Art. VI, Section 25.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
AX.R. — Operation of mopeds and motorized recreational two-, three-, and four-wheeled

vehicles as within scope of driving while intoxicated statutes, 32 A.L.R.5th 659.

41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or
with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath alcohol — Criminal punishment — Arrest without
warrant — Penalties — Suspension or revocation of license.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a violation of:
(i) this section;
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10);

XES
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TRAFFIC RULES AND REGULATIONS

41-6-44

(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol-related reckless driving adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43;
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207; or
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other state, the United
States, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States
which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol-related
reckless driving if committed in this state, including punishments
administered under 10 U.S.C. 815;
(b) a violation of this section includes a violation under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43;
and
(c) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to
exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent
person exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle
within this state if the person:
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or
greater as shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the
alleged operation or physical control; or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense against any
charge of violating this section.
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol concentration in the breath
shall be based upon grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation of Subsection (2)
is guilty of a:
(a) class B misdemeanor; or
(b) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(i) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate
result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent manner; or
(ii) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the vehicle at the time
of the offense.
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, upon a first
conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence,
require the person to work in a community-service work program for not
less than 24 hours.
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program,
the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility, as appropriate; and
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $700.
(d) For a violation committed after July 1,1993, the court may order the
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility determines that the person has a problem condition involving
alcohol or drugs.

41-6-44

MOTOR VEHICLES
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(5) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within six years of a
prior conviction under this section, the court shall as part of any sentence
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence,
require the person to work in a community-service work program for not
less than 80 hours.
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work program,
the court shall:
(i) order the person to participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility, as appropriate; and
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $800.
(d) The court may order the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation facility.
(6) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within six
years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a:
(i) class A misdemeanor except as provided in Subsection (ii); and
(ii) third degree felony if at least:
(A) three prior convictions are for violations committed after
April 23, 1990; or
(B) two prior convictions are for violations committed after
July 1, 1996.
(b) (i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall as part of any sentence
impose a fine of not less than $2,000 and impose a mandatory jail
sentence of not less than 720 hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a jail sentence,
require the person to work in a community-service work program for
not less than 240 hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the
record the reason it finds the defendant should not serve the jail
sentence. Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by the court may be> a sentencing alternative to incarceration or community service if the
program provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term
closely supervised follow-through after the treatment.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or community-service work
program, the court shall order the person to obtain treatment at an
alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility.
(c) Under Subsection (a)(ii) if the court suspends the execution of a
prison sentence and places the defendant on probation the court shall
impose:
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500;
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,000 hours; and
(iii) an order requiring the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol
or drug dependency rehabilitation program providing intensive care
or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised followthrough after treatment.
(7) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under this section
may not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or
probation until any sentence imposed under this section has been served.
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a violation under this
section may not be terminated.
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked
as a result of the conviction under this section, until the convicted person
has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that:
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(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, educa: r,
treatment, arid rehabilitation ordered for " -v^H^i-r. committc 1
July 1, 1993, have been completed;
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for n
>n and n:
ation costs assessed against the person have bc^;. ^ i d , if the COL. iuion
is a second or subsequent conviction for a violation committed within
six years of a prior violation; and
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive or illegal manner
as certified by a licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
facility, if the conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for a
violation committed within six years of two prior violations committed
ifter July 1, 1993.
it quire a
(8< iai (i) The provisions in s u b s e c t i o n s (4), (5), and
sentencing court to order a convicted person to: ,
,ate in an
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the A; ,~„ on of the
court, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependei
bilitation
facility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment at an alcohol u
"idency rehabilitation facility; or do a combination "r
^
bs,
apply to a conviction for a violation of Section 41
>r 41-6-45
under Subsection (9).
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding education or
t r e a t m e n t at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, or
both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction
under Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the court
would render in connection with applying respectively, the first,
second, or subsequent conviction requirements of Subsections (4), (5),
and (6).
(b) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program and any
community-based or other education program provided for in this section
shall be approved by the Department of H u m a n Services.
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or no contest to a
charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under
Section 41-6-43, or of 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for,
an original charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution shall
state for the record a factual basis for the plea, including whether or
not there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant in connection with the violation.
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts t h a t shows
whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant, in connection with the violation.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea
offered under this subsection of t h e consequences of a violation of Section
41-6-44.6 or of 41-6-45.
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section
41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered under this subsection.
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person for a violation
of this section when the officer h a s probable cause to believe the violation has
occurred, although not in his presence, and if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(11) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall:
(i) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of i p :3i S' : n :: : n i ::t EJC!
for the first time under Subsection (2);
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A" for "class B"; and made stylistic
The 1996 a m e n d m e n t by ch. 7 1 , el
1, 1996, added Subsections (l)(a) a n d ^ 1 3 '
redesignated former Subsection (1) a# (2j(a,
and (2Kb) and former Subsection (2) a* (2)(c);
revised and redesignated former Subsections
(3)(b) and (3)(c) as Subsections (1Kb) and (l)(c):
in Subsection (5)(a) substituted "If a person is
convicted under Subsection (2)" for "Upon a
second conviction for a violation committed
and "conviction" for "violation"; rewrote Subsec-

ons (9)(a)(i) and
...
~~ ^
-^ as a prior conviction" after "41-6-45"; deleted former Subsection (9)(b), relating to prior convictions, and
redesignated t h e following subsections accordingly; rewrote Subsections (10)(b) and (10)(c);
added Subsection (12)(a)(iii); and made stylistic
dtiangfes.
The 1996 amendment by ch. 223, effective
^uly 1, 1996, deleted former Subsection
7)(c)(ii) providing completion of an alcohol and
drug dependency rehabilitation program as an
alternative to incarceration, and redesignated
former Subsection (7)(c)(i) as (7)(c); added Subsections (4)(c)(ii) and (5)(c)(ii) making related
redesignation changes; substituted "all or p a r t
of a jail sentence" for "jail" throughout; in
Subsection (6)(b)(i) added "fine of not less t h a n
$900, but not more t h a n $1,000 and a"; in
Subsection (6)(b)(iii) and (7)(d) added 'fine"; in
Subsection (6)(c)(i) substituted "$2,000, but not
more t h a n $5,000" for "$1,000"; in Subsection
(7)(b) substituted "$3,000 but not more t h a n
$10,000" for "$1,000"; in (7)(c) deleted "but only
if t h e court enters in writing on the record the
reason it finds the defendant should not serve
the jail sentence"; and made stylistic and related changes.
The 1997 amendment, effective May 5, 1997,
deleted maximum penalties throughout Subsections (4) to (6), inserted the references to
§ 41-6-44.6 throughout Subsections (8) and (9),
and made numerous stylistic changes.
C o o r d i n a t i o n c l a u s e . — Laws 1996, ch. 71,
ch. 220, and ch. 223 all amended this section.
Chapter 220, § 3 directed that the a m e n d m e n t s
to Subsection (6) in ch. 220 supersede t h e
a m e n d m e n t s to Subsections (6) and (7) in ch.
71; ch. 223, § 5 directed t h a t the a m e n d m e n t s
to Subsection (6) in ch. 220 supersede t h e
a m e n d m e n t s to Subsections (6)(a), (6)(b), and
(7) in ch. 223.
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(2) alleged violations of Section 53-3-227
>prson
operating a vehicle while the person's drivi _0 ^
_
or
revoked for a violation of Section 41-6-44, a local ordinance which complies
with the requirements of Section 41-6-43, Section 41-6-44.10, Section
76-5-207, or a criminal prohibition that the person was charged with
violating as a result of a plea bargain after having been originally charged
with violating one or more of those sections or ordinances.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 41-6-44.8, e n a c t e d \\ ..
1983, c h . 102, § 1; 1987, c h . 138, § 40; 1990,
c h . 299, § 2; 1991, c h . 147, § 2; 1993, c h . 234
§ 34; 1994, c h . 180, § 2; 1996, c h . 47, § I
1996, ch. 71, § 2.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, inserted "or Section 41-6-44.6" at the end of Subsection (1).
The 1996 amendment, by ch. 47, effective
April 29, 1996, substituted "Section 41-6-44" for

.
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cuon U J .
.s section is set out as reconciled by t
> of Legislative Research and (>muuiisei.

41-6-44.10. Implied consent to chemical tests for alcoho
or drug — Number of tests — Refusal — Warning
r e p o r t — Hearing, revocation of license — Ap
peal — Person incapable of refusal — Results oi
test available — Who may give test — Evidence.
(1) (a) A person operating a motor vehicle in this state is considered to have
given his consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine
for the purpose of determining whether he was operating or in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle while having a blood or breath alcohol
content statutorily prohibited under Section 41-6-44 or 53-3-231, while
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or combination of alcohol and any
drug under Section 41-6-44, or while having any measurable controlled
substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body in
violation of Section 41-6-44.6, if the test is or tests are administered at the
direction of a peace officer having grounds to believe that person to have
been operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while having
a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under Section
41-6-44 or 53-3-231, or while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or
combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while
having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6.
(b) (i) The peace officer determines which of the tests are administered
and how many of them are administered.
(ii) If an officer requests more than one test, refusal by a person to
take one or more requested tests, even though he does submit to any
other requested test or tests, is a refusal under this section.
(c) (i) A person who has been requested under this section to submit to
a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine, may not select
the test or tests to be administered.
(ii) The failure or inability of a peace officer to arrange for any
specific chemical test is not a defense to taking a test requested by a
peace officer, and it is not a defense in any criminal, civil, or
administrative proceeding resulting from a person's refusal to submit
to the requested test or tests
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(2) (a) If the person has been placed under arrest, has then u
by a peace officer to submit to any one or more of the chemi'
Subsection (1), and refuses to submit to any chemical t
ne
person shall be warned by the peace officer requesting the w,^ v* ^^^ wiat
a refusal to submit to the test or tests can result in revocation of the
person's license to operate a motor vehicle.
(b) Following the warning under Subsection (a), if the person does not
immediately request t h a t the chemical test or tests as offered by a peace
officer be administered a peace officer shall serve on the person, on behalf
of the Driver License Division, immediate notice of the Driver License
Division's intention to revoke the person's privilege or license to operate a
motor vehicle. When the officer serves the immediate notice on behalf of
the Driver License Division, he shall:
(i) take the U t a h license certificate or permit, if any, of the operator;
(ii) issue a temporary license effective for only 29 days; and
(iii) supply to t h e operator, on a form approved by the Driver
License Division, basic information regarding how to obtain a hearing
before the Driver License Division.
(c) A citation issued by a peace officer may, if approved as to form by the
Driver License Division, serve also as the temporary license.
(d) The peace officer shall submit a signed report, within five days after
the date of the arrest, t h a t he had grounds to believe the arrested person
had been operating or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle
while having a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily prohibited under
Section 41-6-44 or 53-3-231, while under the influence of alcohol, any drug,
or combination of alcohol and any drug under Section 41-6-44, or while
having any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled
substance in the person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6, and t h a t
the person had refused to submit to a chemical test or tests under
Subsection (1).
(e) (i) A person win
- Driver Lice
Muns
m f-cm t-iriTi
action
»iiu
j „

.

oe made in writing within ten

„.i.at.

(iii) Upon written rer^.t^t, the division shall grant to the person an
opportunity to be heard *v ithin 29 days after the date of arrest.
(iv) If the person does not make a timely written request for a
hearing before the division, his privilege to operate a motor vehicle in
the state is revoked beginning on the 30th day after the date of arrest
for a period of:
(A) one year unless Subsection (B) applies; or
(B) 18 months if the person., has had a previous license sanction
after July 1, 1993, under this section, Section 41-6-44.6, 53-3-223,
or 53-3-231 or a conviction after Julv 1 1 993, under Section
41-6-44.
(f) If a hearing is requested by the person and conducted by the Driver
License Division * V u r a r i n g -hall hn documented ~~H - h ~ n c^*— * u ~
issues of:
(i) whethe
- «-Ti -.t !
*: .• .„?
;t a
person was (
.14
41-6-44.6, or
(ii) whether the person refused to -uomit tu the test.
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(g) (i) In connection with the hearing, the division or its authorized
agent:
(A) may administer oatiio
attendance of witnesses and ti
papers; and
(B) shall issue subpoenas for the attendance of necessary peace
officers.
(ii) The division shall pay witness fees d u d i i i i i
* > >
Transportation Fund in accordance with the rates
Section 21-5-4.
(h) If after a hearing, the Driver License Division deterv \- * . Uic
person was requested to submit to a chemical test or tests ..v.: tj.-ed to
submit to the test or tests, or if the person fails to appear before the Driver
License Division as required in the notice, the Driver License Division
shall revoke his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle in Utah
beginning on the date the hearing is held for a period of:
(i) (A) one year unless Subsection (B) applies; or
(B) 18 months if the person has had a previous license sanction
after July 1,1993, under this section, Section 53-3-223, 41-6-44.6,
or 53-3-231 or a conviction after July 1, 1993, under Section
41-6-44.
(ii) The Driver License Division shall also assess against the
person, in addition to any fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(14),
a fee under Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid before the person's
driving privilege is reinstated, to cover administrative costs.
(iii) The fee shall be cancelled if the person obtains an unappealed
court decision following a proceeding allowed under this subsection
that the revocation was improper,
(i) (i) Any person whose license has been revoked by the Driver License
Division under this section may seek judicial review.
(ii) Judicial review of an informal adjudicative proceeding is a trial.
Venue is in the district court in the county in which the person resides.
(3) Any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering
him incapable of refusal to submit to any chemical test or tests is considered to
not have withdrawn the consent provided for in Subsection (1), and the test or
tests may be administered whether the person has been arrested or not.
(4) Upon the request of the person who was tested, the results of the test or
tests shall be made available to him.
(5) (a) Only a physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Section 26-1-30, acting at the request of a peace officer, may
withdraw blood to determine the alcoholic or drug content. This limitation
does not apply to taking a urine or breath specimen.
(b) Any physician, registered nurse, practical nurse, or person authorized under Section 26-1-30 who, at the direction of a peace officer, draws
a sample of blood from any person whom a peace officer has reason to
believe is driving in violation of this chapter, or hospital or medical facility
at which the sample is drawn, is immune from any civil or criminal
liability arising from drawing the sample, if the test is administered
according to standard medical practice.
(6) (a) The person to be tested may, at his own expense, have a physician of
his own choice administer a chemical test in addition to the test or tests
administered at the direction of a peace officer.
(b) The failure or inability to obtain the additional test does not affect
admissibility of the results of the test or tests taken at the direction of a
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* to submit to a chemical test or
(7) For the purpose of
' " ~ consult an attorney or
tests, the person to be tested does
s a condition for the
have an attorney, physician, or c
taking of any test.
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or
any additional test under this section, evidence of any refusal is admissible in
any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising out of acts alleged to have
been committed while the person was operating or in actual physical control of
a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, combination of
alcohol and any drug, or while having any measurable controlled substance or
metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body.
History: C. 1953,41-6-44.10, enacted by L.
1981, ch. 126, § 43; 1983, ch. 99, § 16; 1987,
ch. 129, § 3; 1987, ch. 138, § 41; 1987, ch.
161, § 143; 1987 (1st S.S.), ch. 8, §§ 3, 4;
1988, ch. 148, § 1; 1990, ch. 30, § 21; 1992,
ch. 78, § 3; 1993, ch. 161, § 2; 1993, ch. 193,
§ 2; 1993, ch. 205, § 3; 1993, ch. 234, § 35;
1994, ch. 180, § 3; 1996, ch. 71, § 3; 1997, ch.
10, § 61.
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, inserted "or while
having any measurable controlled substance or
metabolite of a controlled substance in the
person's body in violation of Section 41-6-44.6"
twice in Subsection (l)(a) and once in Subsection (2)(d); substituted "Section 41-6-44.4, 41-6-
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)f Subsection (8).
»* * effective July 1, 1996,
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reference in Subsection
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Cited in Salt Lake City v. Garcia, 912 P.2d
997 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).
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A.L.R. — Driving while intoxicated: subsequent consent to sobriety test as affecting initial refusal, 28 A.L.R.5th 459.
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41-6-44.30. Seizure a n d impoundment! of vehicles by
peace officers — Impound r e q u i r e m e n t s - 11
moval of vehicle by owner.
(1) (a) If a peace officer arrests or cites the operator of a vehicle for violating
Section 41-6-44 or 41-6-44.10, or a local ordinance similar to Section
41-6-44 which complies with Subsection 41-6-43(1), the officer shall:
(i) seize and impound the vehicle, except as provided under "
section (2); and
(ii) remove and seize or cause to be removed or seized, the vehicle's
license plates and registration materials if the operator is a registered
owner of the vehicle.
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(5) Joint clients. As to a communication relevant to •
of common interest between two or more clients u
the communication was made by any of them to a iawye.*
retained or consulted in common, when offered in
action between any of the clients.
matter

505. Government informer.
Definitions. As used in this rule:
11) "Government" means the government of the United
States, of any state, or of any subdivision of any state.
(2) "Informer" means any person who has furnished
information relating to or assisting in an investigation of
a possible violation of law to a law enforcement officer.
(3) "Law enforcement officer" includes peace officers,
prosecutors, a member of a legislative committee or its
staff conducting an investigation and a member of a
regulatory agency or its staff conducting an investigation.
b) General rule of privilege. The government has a
privilege to refuse to disclose the identity of an informer.
ic) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be
claimed by counsel for the government or in the absence of
counsel by another appropriate representative, regardless of
whether the information was furnished to an officer of the
United States government or a state or a subdivision thereof.
A i Rvneptions: voluntary disclosure; informer as witrivilege exists under this rule if the identity of the
.,„«, m.. or the informer's interest in the subject matter of the
informer's communication has been disclosed to those who
would have cause to resent the communication by a holder of
the privilege or by the informer's own action, or if the informer
appears as a witness for the government.
(1) Testimony on merits. If it appears from the
evidence in the case or from other showing by a party that
an informer may be able to give testimony necessary to a
fair determination of the issue of guilt or innocence in a
criminal case or of a material issue on the merits of a civil
case whether or not the government is a party, and the
government invokes a privilege, the judge may give the
government an opportunity to show in camera facts
relevant to determining whether the informer can, in fact,
supply the testimony. The judge may make such orders
respecting the procedures to be followed as are consistent
with the spirit and purpose of this rule. If the judge finds
there is reasonable probability that the informer can give
the testimony, and the government elects not to disclose
the informer's identity, the judge, on motion of the defendant in a criminal case, shall dismiss the charges to which
the testimony would relate, and the judge may do so on
the judge's own motion. In civil cases, the judge may make
any order that justice requires. Evidence submitted to the
judge may be sealed and preserved to be made available to
the appellate court in the event of an appeal, and the
contents shall not otherwise be revealed without consent
of the government. All counsel and parties shall be permitted to be present at every stage of the proceedings
under this subparagraph, except a showing in camera at
which no counsel or party shall be permitted to be
present.
(2) Legality of obtained evidence. If information
from an informer is relied upon to establish the legality of
the means by which evidence was obtained and the party
attacking the legality of obtaining the evidence makes a
substantial preliminary showing that the law enforcement officer intentionally or knowingly or with reckless
disregard for truth falsely swore that the information was
received from an informer reasonably believed to be
reliable or credible and that probable cause does not exist
absent the information furnished by the informer, the
judge may require the identity of the informer to be
disclosed. The judge shall, on request of the government,

Rule 506

direct that the disclosure be made in camera. All counsel
and parties concerned with the issue of legality shall be
permitted to be present at every stage of the proceeding
under this subparagraph, except a disclosure in camera,
at which no counsel or parties shall be permitted to be
present. If disclosure of the identity of the informer is
made in camera, the record thereof shall be sealed and
preserved to be made available to the appellate court in
the event of an appeal, and the contents shall not otherwise be revealed without consent of the government.
Rule 506. Physician and mental health therapist-patient.
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) "Patient" means a person who consults or is examined or interviewed by a physician or mental health
therapist.
(2) "Physician" means a person licensed, or reasonably
believed by the patient to be licensed, to practice medicine
in any state.
(3) "Mental health therapist" means a person who is or
is reasonably believed by the patient to be licensed or
certified in any state as a physician, psychologist, clinical
or certified social worker, marriage and family therapist,
advanced practice registered nurse designated as a registered psychiatric mental health nurse specialist, or professional counselor while that person is engaged in the
diagnosis or treatment of a mental or emotional condition,
including alcohol or drug addition.
(b) General rule of privilege. If the information is communicated in confidence and for the purpose of diagnosing or
treating the patient, a patient has a privilege, during the
patient's life, to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other
person from disclosing (1) diagnoses made, treatment provided, or advice given, by a physician or mental health
therapist, (2) information obtained by examination of the
patient, and (3) information transmitted among a patient, a
physician or mental health therapist, and persons who are
participating in the diagnosis or treatment under the direction
of the physician or mental health therapist, including guardians or members of the patient's family who are present to
further the interest of the patient because they are reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the communications, or
participation in the diagnosis and treatment under the direction of the physician or mental health therapist.
(c) Who may claim the privilege. The privilege may be
claimed by the patient, or the guardian or conservator of the
patient. The person who was the physician or mental health
therapist at the time of the communication is presumed to
have authority during the life of the patient to claim the
privilege on behalf of the patient.
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(1) Condition as element of claim or defense. As to
a communication relevant to an issue of the physical,
mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any
proceeding in which that condition is an element of any
claim or defense, or, after the patient's death, in any
proceedings in which any party relies upon the condition
as an element of the claim or defense;
(2) Hospitalization for mental illness. For communications relevant to an issue in proceedings to hospitalize the patient for mental illness, if the mental health
therapist in the course of diagnosis or treatment has
determined that the patient is in need of hospitalization;
(3) Court ordered examination. For communications made in the course of, and pertinent to the purpose
of, a court-ordered examination of the physical, mental, or
emotional condition of a patient, whether a party or
witness, unless the court in ordering the examination
specifies otherwise.

ADDENDUM C

I N THE FIRST DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF RICH
STATE OF UTAH,

VS

j
PLAINTIFF j

JURY VERDICT

1
CASE NO. 9 6 - D I - l l

LARRY H. BREITWEISER,
DEFENDANT j
We che j u r o r s d u l y impaneled f i n d t h e Defendant, L a r r y H.
Breitweiser,
Guilty of Driving with a .08 grams Alcohol Content or
greater, a Class B Misdemeanor.
Not Guilty of Driving with a .08 grams Alcohol Content or
Greater, a Class B Misdemeanor.

Dated:

Foreperson

